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INTRODUCTION
The complexity of the issue of global reach of private law remedies and procedures is 
evident in the light of the diverse studies assembled in this collection. Several factors are 
at	play,	moral,	political,	social,	cultural	and	economic.	Even	this	classification	of	the	issues	
itself is arguably controversial. To make sense of the enormous amount of development in 
this	field	and	prepare	for	the	future,	certain	pointers	of	strategy,	for	active	participants	as	
well	commentators	and	other	bystanders,	are	necessary.	Any	reflection	on	the	law	and	legal	
evolution, even more importantly in a context of multi-layered transnational evolution 
such	 the	 one	under	 consideration,	must	 start	 by	being	firmly	grounded	 in	 reality.	 The	
following,	it	is	submitted,	are	important	questions	that	the	present	realities	of	the	global	
reach of private law remedies and procedures pose:
•	 What drives this evolution?
•	 How are global remedies and procedures validated and what mechanisms are 
used?
•	 What is the relationship of this evolution to traditional Western (‘abyssal’, in the 
words of Boaventura de Sousa Santos1) modes of thinking? In other words, what 
are the chances of private law throwing away its Western hegemonic shackles and 
transforming itself into a truly global creature?
•	 Taking into account MacIntyre’s (among others) ‘meta-ethical particularism’2 
with important arguments about the moral and cultural relativity undermining 
∗ Reader	in	Law,	University	of	East	Anglia,	Norwich;	Adjunct	Professor,	University	of	Notre	Dame	London	
Law Centre.
1 de	Sousa	Santos,	B	 (2007)	 ‘Beyond	Abyssal	Thinking:	From	Global	Lines	 to	Ecologies	of	Knowledges’	30	
Review, also online www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/AbyssalThinking.pdf (last visited 8 July 2010). 
2 Meta-ethical	particularism	condemns	impartial	moral	principles	as	‘abstract	and	deracinated’,	and	advocates	
that	moral	reasoning	flows	in	narratives	provided	by	the	cultural	community	in	which	individuals	are	situated,	
and	that	the	preservation	and	defence	of	such	community	necessitates	different	moral	status	for	cultural	insiders	
as opposed to outsiders. See MacIntyre, A (1984) After Virtue Notre Dame University Press; Sandel, M (1982) 
Liberalism & The Limits Of Justice	Cambridge	University	Press;	Walzer,	M	(1983)	Spheres Of Justice Basic Books; 
Sandel, M (1992) ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self’ in Avineri, S and DeShalit, A (eds) 
Communitarianism and Individualism Oxford University Press 12; see also Margalit, A (1996) The Decent Society 
Harvard University Press. One of the moral theorists writing in this vain has put this ‘particularism’ of values 
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the uniformity of such concepts, what are the perceived goals of social and/or 
restorative	justice	that	this	evolution	serves,	and	how	effectively	are	they	achieved?	
Are private law remedies and procedures part of the problem, rather than the 
solution, in this regard?
•	 What are the other, political, social, cultural and economic outcomes of this 
evolution?
This	article	attempts	 to	provide	some	answers	 to	 these	questions,	not	necessarily	 in	
the order they are put above, while at the same time bringing together and evaluating the 
evidence presented in individual contributions.
TOWARDS UNIVERSAL ENFORCEMENT OF PRIVATE LAW NORMS
A pragmatic approach to global justice leads to questions of universality and universal 
enforcement of legal norms. Intuitively, all law has a claim to universality. On a formal 
level, as Kelsen has shown, law’s normative language does not need to presuppose the 
existence	of	a	sovereign,	although	in	Kelsen’s	thought	the	effectiveness	of	norms	depends	
on the coercive power of the state. Normativity, like factuality, is actually global. Legal 
norms	can	be	validated	by	other	legal	norms	only,	and	their	efficiency	does	not	need	always	
to depend on any sanctions imposed by a sovereign authority, but on the willingness of 
law	officials	in	different	jurisdictions	to	obey	and	enforce	them.	Such	law	officials,	even	
following Kelsen’s traditional analysis, are designated and empowered by norms that are 
subject	to	exactly	the	same	tests	of	validity	and	efficiency.	Thus	the	legal	order,	including	a	
global	legal	order,	can	come	into	existence	by	means	of	valid	and	efficient	norms,	without	
any	need	for	a	global	political	sovereign	to	come	first	into	existence;	in	fact,	even	in	the	
absence of any such power, in a complete power vacuum (but preferably a vacuum of 
peace).	3 In a global world environment,4	such	officials	may	be	local	officials	with	global	
reach,5	or	global	law	officials	designated	by	treaty,	custom	or	voluntary	procedure.	What	
is	needed,	of	course,	is	the	willingness	and	ability	of	these	officials	to	employ	the	coercive	
power of the jurisdiction, that is, any jurisdiction, not necessarily that of the origin of the 
norm or even that of the forum.
as follows: ‘the question most likely to arise in the minds of the members of the political community is not, what 
would	rational	individuals	choose	under	universalizing	conditions	of	such-and-such	a	sort?	But	rather,	what	
would individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are determined to go on 
sharing it? And this is a question that is readily transformed into, what choices have we already made in the 
course	of	our	common	life?	What	understandings	do	we	(really)	share?’:	Walzer	Spheres Of Justice at 5. See more 
in	Banakas,	S	(2007)	‘A	Global	Concept	of	Justice:	Dream	or	Nightmare?	Looking	at	Different	Concepts	of	Justice	
or	Righteousness	Competing	in	Today’s	World’	67	Louisiana Law Review 1021 at 1022f.
3 One	can,	although	it	is	not	essential,	presuppose	an	International	‘Grundnorm’,	a	device	that	does	not	affect	
in	the	slightest	the	validity	and	efficiency	of	norms.
4 A	useful	definition	of	‘globalisation’	in	this	connection	is:	 ‘a	multidimensional	set	of	social	processes	that	
create, multiply, stretch, and intensify worldwide social interdependencies and exchanges while at the same 
time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connection between the local and the distant.’ 
Steger,	MB	(2003)	Globalization, A Very Short Introduction	Oxford	University	Press	at	13.
5 Compare	 the	 international	 law	doctrines	 of	 extraterritorial	 and	 universal	 jurisdiction.	 See Colangelo, AJ 
(2007)	 ‘Constitutional	Limits	on	Extraterritorial	 Jurisdiction:	Terrorism	and	 the	 Intersection	of	National	and	
International Law’ 48 Harvard International Law Journal 121.
JCL 4:2           5
	 stathis	banakas
Social	and	economic	processes	that	define	globalisation	can	no	longer	be	ruled	by	old-
fashioned political sovereignty and national political institutions,6	indefinitely	postponing	
the legitimisation of global justice processes.7 The intuitive global reach of (national) law 
mentioned above cannot be forever curtailed by national political interest. Globalised 
capital empowers globalised law enforcement in national courts under traditional national 
civil and criminal law categories by creating a market of law enforcement that is itself 
increasingly global,8 client-driven and funded by the global market’s insatiable appetite 
for innovation and change.
Global enforcement of justice as compensation of harm has acquired a new impressive 
momentum riding astride globalised capital. Private law in general and tort law in 
particular,	the	most	effective	mechanism	of	restorative	justice,	are	being	used	in	increasingly	
ambitious ways as mechanisms of global restorative justice. It is not without foundation 
that	 tort	 law	has	 become	 the	most	 politically	 controversial	 field	 of	 contemporary	 legal	
debate,9 being at the same time demonised as capitalism’s arch-enemy10 and hailed as 
the ‘jurisprudence of hope’.11 Enthusiasts have pointed out that in the quest for ‘juster 
justice and a more lawful law’, tort law, being described as public (and, one might add, 
now international public) law in disguise,12 is ‘a compensator, a deterrer, an educator, 
a psychological therapist, an economic regulator, an ombudsperson, and an instrument 
6 Rawls,	J	(1999)	The Law of Peoples Harvard University Press, and Miller, D (1999) Principles of Social Justice, 
Harvard University Press are wrong. As succinctly put by Young, IM (2006) ‘Responsibility and Global Justice: 
A	Social	Connection	Model?’	23	Social Philosophy and Policy 102: ‘Ontologically and morally speaking, though 
not necessarily temporally, social connection is prior to political institutions’.
7 State	intervention	in	several	countries	to	salvage	the	failing	financial	institutions	in	the	recent	credit	crunch	
appeared,	briefly,	 to	point	 to	serious	structural	 failures	of	financial	globalisation	but	 the	resurgence	of	state	
sovereign	power	to	financial	self-determination	may	be	very	short-lived,	as	global	markets	take	their	revenge	
on	 state	 sovereign	debt,	 downgrading	 and	 speculating	 on	 entire	 so-called	 ‘sovereign’	 economies	with	 little	
realistic possibility of regulation or control, as the latest G20 summit in Canada (July 2010) has shown.
8 No	need	to	labour	the	point	here	of	the	worldwide	dominance	of	so-called	‘global’	law	firms.	See	eg	websites	
for	three	of	the	leading	global	law	firms	in	the	world	today:	http://www.cliffordchance.com/home/default.aspx;	
http://www.bakernet.com/BakerNet/Firm+Profile/Welcome/default	.htm;	http://www.lw.com/default.asp.
9 On	 the	 often	 heated,	 highly	 politicized	 debate	 about	United	 States	 tort	 reform,	 see	 Feinman,	 JM	 (2005)	
‘Unmaking and Remaking Tort Law’ 5 J High Tech L 61; see also Banakas, S  (2006) ‘What Is Tort Law for in 
Today’s World?’ in Essays on Tort, Insurance, Law and Society, in Honour of Bill W. Dufwa, Vol I Jure Voerlag AB 99.
10 See	Schumer,	C	(2007) ‘Tort Epiphany’ Wall Street Journal 29 January A16 (‘we didn’t expect to see a leading 
Senate Democrat declare that tort law abuse is making America less economically competitive’). The cost of the 
US	tort	system	has	risen	from	0.5%	to	2.3%	of	GDP	during	the	last	three	decades.	Projecting	forward,	over	3%	of	
GDP	($360	billion)	could	be	spent	annually	on	US	litigation	within	the	next	ten	years	—	the	equivalent	of	total	
US defence spending in 2002.
11 See	Lambert,	TF	Jr	(1965)	‘The	Jurisprudence	of	Hope’	31	Journal of the American Trial Lawyers Association 
29; also Rustad, M (1994) ‘The Jurisprudence of Hope: Preserving Humanism in Tort Law’ 28 Suffolk UL Rev 
1099.	Tort	 law	 is	also	accorded	 ‘therapeutic’	qualities.	See	Feldthusen,	B	 (1993)	 ‘The	Civil	Action	 for	Sexual	
Battery:	Therapeutic	Jurisprudence?’	25	Ottawa L Rev	203.	In	‘Understanding	Tort	Law’	23	Val UL Rev 485 at 526 
Weinrib, EJ (1989) goes overboard in his enthusiasm. He states that “Explaining love in terms of ulterior ends 
is necessarily a mistake, because a loving relationship has no ulterior end. Love is its own end. In that respect, 
tort law is just like love’.
12 Linden,	AM	(2005)	‘Viva	Torts’,	5	J High Tech L	139,	142	(quoting	Tom	Lambert).	Thus,	in	countries	in	the	
French legal tradition with highly developed systems of administrative (public) tort liability, administrative 
courts enforce tort claims for violations of collective rights: see Henao, JC (2005) ‘Collective Rights and 
Collective Actions: Samples of European and Latin American Contributions’ in Madden, MS (ed) Exploring 
Tort Law Cambridge University Press 426, on the’ acciones populares, an administrative law remedy that serves 
functions similar to class actions. For another view of the public function of tort law in the US, see Calabresi, G 
(2005)	‘The	Complexity	of	Torts	—	The	case	of	Punitive	Damages’	in	id	333,	arguing	at	337	that	the	first	function	
of	tort	law	is	to	enforce	societal	norms	through	the	use	of	private	Attorney’s	General.
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for empowering the injured to help themselves and other potential victims of all sorts of 
wrongdoing in our society’.13
If there ever was a clear divide between public and private law remedies and 
procedures,	 global	 bottom-up	 enforcement	 of	 restorative	 justice	 has	 made	 such	 a	
distinction even more problematic both at a theoretical and, increasingly, at an empirical 
level	too.	It	 is	 increasingly	difficult	to	classify	individual	causes	of	action	as	‘private’	or	
‘public’, as inventive litigants will try to access jurisdictions globally on either side of the 
divide. Moreover, these individual causes of action arise from wrongs that themselves 
defy	classification.	Remedies	are	sought	as	part	of	broader,	comprehensive	strategies,	and,	
as the Indian experience of public interest litigation in particular has shown, it becomes 
increasingly irrelevant whether they were originally private or public in nature. The 
traditional Western dogmatic distinction between public and private is swept away in 
modern	conditions	of	global	social	movement	and	economic	globalisation.	Different	parts	
of national, sub-national and transnational legal systems, cultures and traditions are being 
reshaped	and	co-opted	in	the	process	of	financial	globalisation;	public	law	remedies	acquire	
new functions as mechanisms of individual, private redress, and, conversely, private law 
remedies acquire new functions as mechanisms of public order and regulation. For the 
purposes	of	this	article,	‘private’	denotes	the	bottom-up,	privately	driven,	enforcement	of	
restorative	 justice	world-wide,	not	a	Western-style	 systematic	 classification	of	 remedies	
and procedures.
Global	 private	 law	 remedies	 can	 be	 financed	 by	 the	 markets	 themselves,	 and	 can	
arguably be part of the answer to the apparently insoluble problem of extreme deprivation 
and global social welfare. As has been pointed out by market insiders, business is vulnerable 
to	new	forms	of	‘legal	activism’	or	‘legal	entrepreneurism’.	This	reflects	three	trends:	the	
shift	by	NGOs	away	from	attacking	to	exploiting	legislation;	the	emergence,	particularly	
in	North	America,	of	a	highly	profitable	class	actions	industry;	and	the	arrival	of	a	new	
generation of lawyers, many of whom put correcting social and environmental injustice 
ahead of salary and career development. ‘Many forms of traditional corporate shelter from 
liability	…	separation	by	geography,	incorporation	or	time	…	have	been	attacked	and,	in	
some instances, undermined’.14
PRIVATE LAW REMEDIES AND GLOBAL LEGAL CULTURES
David	Nelken’s	multi-patterned	approach	to	legal	culture(s)15 points to a need to consider 
the	effect	of	dominant	patterns	of	global	legal	cultures	on	the	actual	enforcement	globally	
of	private	law	rights,	in	the	private	pursuit	of	social	justice.	Global	patterns	of	legal	cultures	
and	ideologies	crisscrossing	from	north	to	south	and	west	to	east	are	evident.	The	‘diffusion	
of economic and legal models from the global North to the global South’16 is combined 
13 Linden,	‘Viva	Torts’ supra n 12.
14 ‘SustainAbility,	 the	 Changing	 Landscape	 of	 Liability:	 A	 Director’s	 Guide	 to	 Trends	 In	 Corporate,	
Environmental,	Social	and	Economic	Liability’	(2005)	available	at	http://www.sustainability.com/downloads_
public/insight_reports/	liability.pdf.	
15 See	Nelken,	D	(2004)	‘Using	the	Concept	of	Legal	Culture’	29	Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1.
16 de	Sousa	Santos,	B	and	Rodríguez-Garavito,	CA	(eds)	 (2005)	Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a 
Cosmopolitan Legality Cambridge: Cambridge University Press at 1. This is true only if it is reversed for the 
southern hemisphere where, for example, Australia or New Zealand are the origin rather than the destination 
of	such	a	diffusion.
JCL 4:2           7
	 stathis	banakas
with an increasingly cosmopolitan mix of Western legal traditions and others, such as 
religious	or	far	eastern	traditions.	Legal	cultures	and	socio-economic	patterns	interface	in	
complex ways. Western-style private law remedies and procedures may transmute into 
something alien to Western lawyers’ cultures,17 as they are used and perceived in non-
Western societies and legal cultures.
‘Society is the primary realm of social experience … what’s immediately and truly 
important	to	people,	like	desire	and	its	fulfilment	or	frustration,	goes	on	there	…	the	realm	of	
production, commerce, the market, the family’.18 Whatever else it might be, law is a system of 
behavioural control in society; indeed, it is the most important system of behavioural control, 
an aspect of government or authority, enforced by state power against individual will. 
Private law remedies and procedures cannot, therefore, be properly known and understood, 
unless	 their	 role	 in	a	given	society	and	 their	use	by	 the	people	 living	 in	 it	are	 identified.	
How the law, and the legal system with all its various components and sub-divisions or 
sub-structures, are perceived by the members of each society, determines both their role and 
use. Looking at China, because of its obvious global importance as an emerging superpower, 
in the traditional Chinese conception of law, the law is ‘only for the barbarians, who have 
not had the advantage of being civilised in the manner of the Celestial Empire’.19 There is 
no tradition of respect for the rule of law as the foundation of social co-existence, similar to 
that in traditional Western legal thinking; indeed, in the history of Chinese legal culture, the 
rise of law and legalism has been linked with the decline of civilisation and personal dignity 
and honour. After 1949, this old tradition was replaced to a large extent by a particularly 
Chinese brand of Marxism-Leninism, with a further crucial transformation in the wake of 
the	collapse	of	the	Cultural	Revolution	in	the	late	1970s,	introducing	a	post-socialist	era	in	
which, however, the socialist foundations of the constitution are retained, together with an 
evolved notion of quasi ‘messianic’ Communist Party leadership. Three of the studies in this 
collection show the importance of all this for understanding the emerging role of private law 
remedies and procedures in China today.
Deeply	rooted	historical,	ideological	and	political	attitudes	and	beliefs	about	the	nature,	
role and use of law in society are part of the general legal culture of every society. The law 
itself	may	or	may	not	spring	from	legal	culture	so	defined;	in	the	case	of	legal	transplants,	
it may even be originally alien to the broader legal culture in the receiving society. Law-
givers or law-makers, laying down or creating legal rules, issue artefacts that penetrate social 
life,	though	to	an	extent	that	varies	in	different	societies.	Legal	rules	are	indeed,	as	has	been	
observed,20 ‘what most people think of as law’, and a lawyer’s job is to understand, describe, 
apply and evaluate such rules. Before social scientists, laymen or anybody else can even 
start	 reflecting	on	 law	and	society,	 they	need	 to	 turn	 to	 the	 lawyer	 trained	 in	 translating	
the meaning of these rules in their inner systematic, semantic context. But if, as another 
prominent scholar has pointed out,21 the importance of law in society lies more in what 
17 An	almost	ubiquitous	example	is	the	innovative	and	complex	financial	products	in	Islamic	finance:	see	eg	
Yunis, H (ed) (2009) Islamic Finance Oxford University Press.
18 Gordon,	R	(1984)	‘Critical	Legal	Histories’	36	Stanford Law Review	57	at	60
19 Young,	TL	(1991)	‘Bentham	Meets	Confucius’	44	Current Legal Problems 261 at 265.
20 Merryman,	 JH	 (1978)	 ‘On	 the	 Convergence	 (and	 Divergence)	 of	 the	 Civil	 Law	 and	 the	 Common	 Law’	 in	
Cappelletti	,	M	(ed)	New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe	Sijthoff	195	at	222.
21 Jolowicz,	JA	(1978)	‘New	Perspectives	of	a	Common	Law	of	Europe:	Some	Practical	Aspects	and	the	Case	for	
Applied	Comparative	Law’	in	id	238	at	239.
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it does than in what it says, then it must be true that ‘legal culture … determines when, 
why, and where people use law, legal institutions or legal process; and when they use other 
institutions, or do nothing’.22 
‘Culture’ as a general concept can be understood as meaning people’s work on their 
environment or people’s creations, as contrasted with God’s or nature’s creations and natural 
processes. Thus, one can talk of a ‘cultural heritage’ or ‘ways and techniques’ of culture, as 
well	as	of	different	kinds	of	cultural	activity,	such	as	 industrial	or	rural	culture,	national,	
regional, local or family culture, class culture and so on. Culture in the broader sense is 
everything that is not nature,23 ‘the osmosis of the real and the imaginative, across symbols, 
myths, norms, ideals and ideologies’.24 But in a narrow sense, culture may mean not all the 
human works or products but ‘the residue … of everything that is not politics, or economics, 
or religion’.25 Culture is indeed a characteristic of the evolution of the human species, an 
evolution which is purposeful beyond strictly natural-biological boundaries. The great legal 
anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski has accordingly described all culture as ‘normative’.26 
This important aspect, especially of legal culture, implies that a group’s or a community’s 
conformity to aspired aims and goals serves the function of providing answers to normative 
problems. 
Social scientists tend to emphasise the importance of individual and collective values, 
attitudes	towards	the	legal	system	and	behavioural	patterns	in	society	in	shaping	the	legal	
culture of that society.27 Members of the general public’s ‘lay’ legal culture is distinguished 
from legal professionals’ ‘internal’ legal culture. The former, far from being uniform, can exist 
on	several	different	levels:	the	lay	legal	culture	of	a	whole	country	or	nation,	or	that	of	a	social	
class, or of a regional or local or other (religious, for example) group of people, including the 
lay legal culture of socially excluded communities. In most contemporary societies there is 
more than one social class or culture group in one or more of these senses, and, therefore, also 
several	legal	cultures	(cultural	pluralism).	In	the	current	conditions	of	financial	globalisation,	
when, as Santos puts it, the economy is disembedded from local society28 and when massive 
movements of people, authorised as well as clandestine, take place, the gap between legal 
enforcement	and	lay	legal	culture	is	widening	and	increasingly	diversifying,	with	different	
parts	 of	 societies	 and	 communities	 responding	 differently	 to	 legal	 regimes.	 By	 contrast,	
internal	 legal	 culture	 is,	 under	 the	 force	 of	 financial	 globalisation,	 converging,	with	 one	
22 Friedman,	LM	(1977)	Law and Society	Prentice-Hall	76.
23 ‘Culture	consists	of	patterns,	explicit	and	implicit,	of	and	for	behavior	acquired	and	transmitted	by	symbols,	
constituting the distinctive achievements of a human group, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential 
core	of	culture	consists	of	traditional	(ie	historically	derived	and	selected)	ideas	and	especially	their	attached	values;	
culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other hand as conditioning 
elements of further action’: Kroeber, AL and Kluckhohn, C (1952) Culture, A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions 
Harvard University Peabody Museum 181.
24 Ibid.
25 Definition	given	by	Edgar	Morin	(1968),	in	the	rubric	of	the	article	‘Culture	de	masse’	in	the	Encyclopaedia 
Universalis Paris.
26 In	his	1945	book	The Dynamics of Cultural Change: An Inquiry into Race Relations in Africa Yale University Press 
44-45.
27 An	approach	best	represented	by	Lawrence	Friedman,	whose	classic	definition	of	legal	culture	starts	with	
a number of questions: ‘Do people feel and act as if courts are fair? When are they willing to use courts? What 
parts	of	the	law	do	they	consider	legitimate?	What	do	they	know	about	law	in	general?	Friedman,	LM	(1975)	
The Legal System, A Social Science Perspective	Russell	Sage	193-94.
28 de	Sousa	Santos,	B	(2005)	 ‘The	Counter-Hegemonic	Use	of	Law	in	the	Struggle	for	a	Globalization	from	
Below’ in Escamilla, M and Saavedra, M (eds) Derecho Y Justicia En Una Sociedad Global	401	at	435.
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particular variety, the Anglo-American common law, acquiring prominence on both an 
international and transnational level.29 
Despite the criticisms of this rather simplistic distinction between lay and internal 
culture,	 it	seems	to	offer	a	rather	more	useful	 tool	of	analysis	of	 the	effect	on	the	ground	
of the global reach of private law remedies than other notions such as legal tradition30 or 
style of legal systems.31	American	Legal	Realists	of	different	persuasions32 use style to denote 
the social, psychological and political factors of judicial law-making in superior appellate 
courts.	But	the	distinct	‘pragmatic’	physiognomy	of	judicial	style	has	been	under	fire	from	
modern cultural theories of law, aiming at tipping the balance over to the interpretational 
value of legal culture in Western communities, not only in understanding but also in making 
the law (Ronald Dworkin)33 or even ‘trashing’ it (critical legal studies).34 Be that as it may, 
there is ample evidence in the studies in this collection of the importance of judicial style 
driven by political agenda in the process of creating new remedies and procedures for global 
wrongs. Alan Watson also deserves a mention here. His work on the organic integration 
of legal transplants35 shows that ‘inner’ legal culture is a powerful and autonomous factor 
either of legal change or of resistance to change in the face of changing social and political 
conditions, and distinguishes between the legal culture of lawyers and lawmakers,36 arguing 
that comparative legal history shows beyond dispute the extent to which the lawmakers’ 
culture is not only distinct but also most powerful and not to be confused with the culture of 
other lawyers. Social or economic pressure for legal change starting with lawmakers operates 
only within their own culture, whereas if such pressure starts with the lawyers, their culture 
is involved and the pressure must be directed against the culture of the lawmakers.37 The 
existence	 of	 a	 distinct	 culture	 of	 lawmakers	 explains,	 first,	 the	 historical	 phenomenon	of	
29 Defined	by	Friedman	Law and Society	supra	n	22	at	76	as	the	process	of	law-making	and	law-finding,	the	
methods of legal reasoning of judges, the structure of the legal system and the administration of justice in a 
given jurisdiction, and the training and organisation of the legal profession.
30 Merryman’s	definition	of	‘legal	tradition’	includes	‘historically	conditioned	attitudes	about	the	nature	of	the	law,	
about the role of law in the society and the polity, about the proper organisation and operation of a legal system, 
and	about	the	way	law	is	or	should	be	made,	applied,	studied,	perfected	and	taught’.	This	definition	obviously	
does not distinguish between ‘lay’ and ‘internal’ legal culture. Merryman, JH (1969) The Civil Law Tradition Stanford 
University Press 2. Compare, however, the more complex approach of Glenn, HP (2004) Legal Traditions of the World 
Oxford University Press. 
31 Rather	more	exciting	 is	 the	view	of	 legal	 culture	as	 embedded	 in	 the	 idea	of	 ‘style’	of	 legal	 systems,	 in	
Zweigert,	 K	 and	Kotz,	H	 (1984)	Einfuhrung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts, Band I, 
2e Auflage JCB Mohr 80f. The crucial stylistic factors of legal systems according to these writers are: (a) their 
historical background and development; (b) their predominant and characteristic modes of thought in legal 
matters;	(c)	especially	distinctive	legal	institutions;	(d)	the	kinds	of	legal	sources	acknowledged	by	them	and	
the way they are handled, and (e) their ideology. ‘Style’ is, however, an inward-looking concept, very much 
a lawyer’s tool, that could, if applied as evolved in Western legal thinking, distort the picture of non-Western 
laws. ‘Style’ is an important concept if law is supreme in society, if the rule of law is viewed with the importance 
attached	to	it	by	Western	legal	cultures,	a	hermeneutical	concept	heavily	biased	towards	a	‘plain-fact’	view	of	
the law. 
32 Most	 famously	Llewellyn,	K	 (1960)	The Common Law Tradition, Deciding Appeals	Little,	Brown	&	Co.	See	
earlier	Holmes,	OW		(1897)	‘The	prophecies	of	what	the	courts	will	do	in	fact	and	nothing	more	pretentious	
are what I mean by law’ (The ‘bad man’s’ view of the law): ‘The Path of the Law’ 10 Harvard Law Review	457.
33 See	Dworkin,	R	(1986)	Law’s Empire Harvard University Press esp 410f.
34 See	 the	 good	 account	 of	 the	 movement	 in	 Kelman,	M	 (1987)	A Guide to Critical Legal Studies Harvard 
University Press.
35 Watson,	A	(1974)	Legal Transplants	Scottish	Academic	Press.
36 Watson,	A	 (1983)	 ‘Legal	Change:	 Sources	 of	 Law	 and	Legal	Culture’	 131	University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 1121 at 1152f.
37 Id	at	1154.
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jurisdictions borrowing socially and economically ‘dysfunctional’ legal transplants. ‘To 
a considerable degree, the lawmakers of one society share the same legal culture with 
lawmakers of other societies’.38 Secondly, the legal culture of lawmakers can be responsible 
for their positive disinclination to change formally the rules, institutions and especially the 
sources of law when the law is out of date.39 Watson’s views of a separate culture of lawmakers 
are, however, based on historical observations and conclusions assuming the existence of a 
group	of	lawmakers	that	is	clearly	and	significantly	distinct	from	the	larger	group	of	lawyers.	
This distinction is often not sustainable in today’s environment of globalised legal practice 
and proliferation of soft law normative regimes. 
Lay	 legal	 cultural	 pluralism	 is	 flourishing	 under	 conditions	 of	 financial	 and	 media	
globalisation. How true is it in these conditions that what the law does is determined by 
‘internal’ legal culture and what it should be by ‘lay’ legal culture? And how true is it that: 
‘Society	is	not	based	upon	law;	this	is	a	juridical	fiction.	On	the	contrary,	the	law	must	rest	on	
society. It must be the expression of its common interests and needs arising from the actual 
methods of material production against the caprice of the single individual.’40 The Marxist 
conception of law is based on the belief that the relationships of production determine what 
the law is.41 The question here is whether culture in general, and legal culture in particular, 
are	significantly	autonomous	from	the	aims	and	goals	of	the	socio-political	and	economic	
model in which the law also operates.42 The fact that economic materialism cannot explain 
why ‘dog is not eaten in the United States’ or why ‘women wear or wore ribbons in their 
hair’43	does	not	prove	that	culture	is	significantly	autonomous.	It	is	true	that	legal	culture(s)	
originating in historical and transcendental practices, values and beliefs about law and its 
place in social life may be swept aside by the winds of political and economic change. This 
is clearly what happened, for example, in Stalinist and post-Stalinist Russia, and in Maoist 
and	post-Maoist	China.	It	is	also	what	is	happening	now,	with	financial	globalisation.	It	is,	
however, also true that legal culture(s) may successfully resist such change, and slow down 
or distort social engineering. Law reform must often take legal culture into account, even if 
only in order to suppress and transform it into a new kind. 
As demonstrated by Kelsen’s exposition of the contradictions in Marxist legal thought,44 
it is not always easy to identify legal culture as a cognisable social reality separate from the 
social and economic goals pursued through law. ‘Although the careful study of a single 
legal culture can yield valuable insights, only the analysis of a variety of legal cultures will 
38 Id	at	1157.
39 Id	at	1151.
40 Marx,	K	(1895)	Vor den Koelner Geschworenen	Hottingen	15.
41 ‘The	law	is	only	a	symptom,	expression	of	other	relationships,	on	which	the	power	of	the	state	is	based’,	
Marx,	K	(1867)	Das Kapital,	Vol.	I,	p.	307.	The	old	English	Factory	Acts	were,	according	to	Marx,	‘just	as	much	
the	necessary	product	of	modern	industry	as	cotton	yarns,	self-actors,	and	electric	telegraph’.	Engels	added	that	
‘the jurist imagines he is operating from a priori principles, whereas in reality they are really only economic 
reflexes’.	(1935)	Marx–Engels Correspondence 1846-1895, A Selection, Foreign Languages Publishing House 482. 
But, subsequently, in communist legal thought, the adoption of select aspects of ‘bourgeois culture with respect 
both to law and to the court’ was considered useful for engineering the progress of Soviet socialism. See Smirnov, 
VV (1985) ‘Law, Culture, Politics: Theoretical Aspects’ in Butler, WE and Kudriavtsev, VN (eds) Comparative 
Law and Legal System: Historical and Socio-legal Perspectives	Oceana	23,	 24.	Ditto,	 in	Chinese	 communist	 legal	
thought. 
42 See	my	paper	(1982)	‘Some	Thoughts	on	the	Method	of	Comparative	Law:	The	Concept	of	Law	Revisited’, 
67	Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 289-309.
43 Examples	given	in	Watson,	‘Legal	Change’	supra	n	36	at	1155.
44 Kelsen,	H	(1955)	The Communist Theory of Law Praeger ch. 1.
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recognise what is accidental rather than necessary, what is permanent rather than changeable 
in legal norms and legal agencies, and what characterises the beliefs underlying both.’45 
As with everything else perceived and understood, law and legal culture is perceived and 
understood comparatively; comparison is the basis of all knowledge. But does comparison 
not presuppose a separate identity? Can a thing be compared to itself? 46 How culturally 
specific	can	the	law	be?	Is	it	true	that	‘the	modern	world	makes	a	strong	case	against	cultural	
specificity’?47 Often it is the existence of diverse (or similar) social structures and economies, 
rather	than	‘cultures’	in	the	sense	of	values	and	attitudes	of	lawyers	and	lay-persons,	that	
accounts	 for	 diversity	 (or	 convergence)	 in	 the	 laws	 of	 different	 countries.	Montesquieu’s	
view of law as a product of national and cultural forces has been repeatedly challenged by 
more modern views underlining the importance of the social and political environment.48 
But is this only true for societies in the hegemonic West? It appears that the more societies 
advance in their political, economic and social structures, the more powerful these structures 
themselves	become	over	 cultural	 specificity	 in	 shaping	 the	 law’s	 real	 identity,	 behind	 its	
symbolic	or	ritual	 image.	There	 is	also	evidence	 that	 legal	 transplants	of	 ‘official’	 law	are	
more	 likely	 to	affect	 the	social	or	economic	environment	 than	 the	receiving	community’s	
legal	 culture.	But	beyond	 the	hegemonic	West,	 things	may	be	different.	The	 introduction	
of English procedural law into Indian courts led to a ‘clash of … values … the Indians in 
response	thought	only	of	manipulating	the	new	situation	and	did	not	use	the	courts	to	settle	
disputes but only to further them’.49 
Legal rules and legal institutions, uprooted from their original cultural soil, can be used 
as tools for engineering social goals in foreign climates. But it ought to be kept in mind that 
indigenous legal culture functions as an immunity system, and the survival of the transplant 
often depends on cultural suppression or mutation. Indeed, suppression or mutation of 
indigenous legal culture is generally the desired aim of a transplant. A fascinating case study 
is	Japan,	whose	economy	has	long	been	integrated	into	financial	globalisation.	Traditional	
Japanese	 values	 and	 cultural	 attitudes	 were	 overwhelmed	 by	 the	 post-War	 constitution	
introducing the supreme authority of the principles of the rule of law and due process 
over any legal act of the legislature or executive.50 As these two principles are fundamental 
elements	of	traditional	Western	legal	culture,	they	can	be	better	understood	in	the	light	of	
the ‘internal’ legal culture of the West, and, in particular, Anglo-American common law. But 
the cultural context refuses to go away.51 It has been observed that there are relatively few 
civil	cases	in	Japan:	ordinary	people	are	said	to	find	it	difficult	to	have	access	to	attorneys.52 
45 Ehrmann,	HW	(1976)	Comparative Legal Cultures Prentice-Hall 11.
46 With	all	due	respect	to	Glenn’s	provocative	thoughts	in	this	connection.	See	Glenn,	HP	(2004)	Legal Traditions 
of the World (2nd ed) Oxford University Press.
47 Friedman	The Legal System supra	n	27	at	195.
48 Eg	Kahn-Freund,	O	(1974)	‘On	Uses	and	Misuses	of	Comparative	Law’	37	Modern Law Review 1; Seidman, 
RB	(1970)	‘Administrative	Law	and	Legitimacy	in	Anglophonic	Africa:	A	Problem	in	the	Reception	of	Foreign	
Law’ 5 Law and Society Review 161.
49 See	Cohn,	BS	(1967)	‘Some	Notes	on	Law	and	Change	in	North	India’	in	Bohannon,	P	(ed)	Law and Warfare, 
Studies in the Anthropology of Conflict	The	Natural	History	Press	139	at	155.
50 See	Oda,	H	(1992)	Japanese Law,	Butterworths	35f.	
51 See	Wren,	HG	(1968)	‘Legal	System	of	Pre-Western	Japan’	20	Hastings Law Journal	217	at	221:	‘the	emphasis	
is on the relations between men, not individuals’; contrast the Western idea of law and justice as rational and 
impersonal,	described	by	a	Japanese	scholar	as	the	‘law	of	the	geometric	mind’:	Noda,	T	(1971)	‘The	Far-Eastern	
Conception of Law’ in International Encyclopedia of Comparative law Vol II, ch. 1 at 120. 
52 Hayashiya,	R	(1988)	‘Minji-sosho	no	Genkyo	no	Nichidoku	Hikaku’	(‘Comparison	of	the	Current	State	of	
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Rule of law and due process, constitutionally super-imposed, are bound to have acquired 
a	special	flavour	and	identity	in	a	legal	culture	that	detests	the	sharp	distinction	between	
legal rights and wrongs, rejects the planning of legal acts and argument in anticipation of 
a judicially contested dispute, and endorses a principle of ‘common’ or ‘shared’ blame as 
the	basis	of	resolution	of	conflicts	between	parties.53 A Japanese scholar, Hayashiya, seems 
to	have	suggested	 that	 the	difficulty	 in	finding	a	 lawyer	 in	 Japan	 is	 the	reason	 for	scarce	
civil litigation in that country.54 But two other writers have argued that the reverse is true: 
because of the infrequency of litigation, as a result of the aspects of lay legal culture pointed 
out	above,	Japan	can	afford	to	have	such	a	comparatively	small	number	of	lawyers.55 It is 
possible that neither of these views is wrong: social and economic factors and legal culture 
interact	in	a	way	that	is	hard	to	identify.	‘Legal	culture	is	difficult	to	research,	and	there	is	
little	systematic	data	on	comparative	culture’;	this	seems	to	still	be	the	case,	almost	40	years	
after	these	comments	were	first	made.56
In a complex cultural environment, how can private law remedies and procedures, 
primarily Western-designed legal devices, emigrate and be used globally? It would help if one 
could establish the existence of any universal characteristics of legal devices and techniques 
rendering Western private law remedies and procedures more user-friendly in alien cultures. 
Separate cultures, separate communities within and outside these cultures, and the more or 
less cosmopolitan societies in which they co-exist must all be taken into account. Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, the French philosopher, forcefully argued that ‘the perceived world is the 
always presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value, all existence’.57 Law is understood 
as	perceived;	and	its	origin	is	perceived	as	rooted	in	chiefly	political	power	relations.58 Legal 
culture is not only an empirical reality but also a basis of meaning, that is, of talking about 
the law. As pointed out by the American pragmatist philosopher Dewey, all description 
of social and cultural phenomena by language is itself purposeful; as he put it, social and 
cultural phenomena are never ‘over and done with’ but remain always open, are ‘goings-
on’.59 The German anthropologist Richard Thurnwald argued for the law to be perceived and 
understood ‘functionally out of the cultural system’60;	 this	is	confirmed	by	the	pioneering	
legal anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski: his experience in studying primitive laws taught 
him the importance of perceiving culture as an instrumental reality, in which law does not 
work automatically, but functionally. He notes that ‘there exist even in the simplest forms 
of culture types of debate and quarrel, mutual recrimination, and readjustment by those 
in	authority	—	all	of	which	correspond	 to	 the	 judicial	process	 in	more	highly	developed	
cultures	…	even	 in	primitive	communities	norms	can	be	classified	 into	 rules	of	 law,	 into	
Civil Procedure between Germany and Japan’) 10 Hosojiho	36,	quoted	by	Oda	Japanese Law supra n 50 at 102.
53 Noda	‘The	Far-Eastern	Conception	of	Law’	supra	n	51	at	133.
54 As	quoted	by	Oda	Japanese Law supra n 50 at 102, who appears to endorse this view.
55 Kim,	C	and	Lawson,	CM	(1979)	‘The	Law	of	the	Subtle	Mind:	The	Traditional	Japanese	Conception	of	Law’	
28 International & Comparative Law Quarterly	491	at	509	n	167.
56 Friedman,	The Legal System supra	n	27	at	209.
57 See	‘Le	primat	de	la	perception	et	ses	consequences	philosophiques’	(1947)	41	Bulletin de la Societe Francaise de 
Philosophie 120.
58 See	Hamrick,	WS	(1987)	An Existential Phenomenology of Law: Maurice Merleau-Ponty Springer 116; translations 
of Merleau-Ponty’s French writings are borrowed from this book.
59 See	Ryan,	A	(1998)	‘Pragmatism	and	Property’	in	Harris,	JW	(ed)	Property Problems	Sweet	&	Maxwell.
60 In	Thurnwald,	R	(1934)	Werden, Wandel und Gestaltung des Rechts im Lichte der Volkerforschung	Berlin	&	Leipzig	
Vol. II 6.
JCL 4:2           13
	 stathis	banakas
custom, into ethics, and into manners’.61 We have here an observation which, if valid, could 
go	some	way	towards	explaining	the	effectiveness	of	Western	legal	devices	globally.	
But Malinowski’s view of normative similarities between developed and primitive 
systems	 of	 conflict	 resolution	 contradicts	 what	 has	 been	 described	 as	 the	 developing	
countries’ resistance to the rule of law in today’s world.62 This resistance varies according 
to whether these countries are closer to open access social orders or limited access (natural) 
social orders.63	Additionally,	contemporary	legal	anthropologists	have	established	patterns	
of alternative legal consciousness in communities across the West-East spectrum, rejecting 
recourse to the rule of law and rejecting the use of the courts. Groups of conscientious 
objectors	to	the	state-run	legal	process	and	the	private	law	remedies	and	procedures	on	offer	
have, of course, always existed, but they appear to have been given fresh momentum by 
the	financial	globalisation	process.64	What	is,	however,	more	difficult	to	conceptualise	is	the	
apparent	lack	of	overall	global	effect	of	any	such	resistance	to	the	Western	hegemonic	‘rule	
of law’ culture before the advance of global private law practice and migration of private law 
remedies and procedures. But, as I have explained elsewhere in more detail,65 global market 
forces also lead a drive towards global legal norms to the extent that such norms are necessary 
for	the	proper	enjoyment	of	financial	gains	on	a	global	scale.	Such	norms	are	expeditiously	
and	efficiently	 introduced	globally,	with	or	without	 the	 consent	of	national	governments	
and national legal orders that have no choice but to succumb to their jurisdiction if they do 
not want to remain excluded from globalised capital, or, in other words, regardless of any 
resistance	of	developing	countries	to	the	rule	of	law.	Developing	countries	often	have	little	
alternative but to accept Western-style private law mechanisms of dispute resolution and 
enforcement. 
PRIVATE LAW REMEDIES, DISPERSED LOSSES, COLLECTIVE REDRESS 
AND THE DYNAMICS OF GLOBALISED LEGAL PRACTICE
Private law remedies other than tort remedies have been crossing state jurisdictional 
borders	 for	 some	 time,	 especially	 after	 the	 surge	 in	 legal,	 financial	 and	 cultural	
globalisation following the collapse of the communist empires. These include remedies for 
breach of contract, breach of statutory duty and international treaty violations, and even 
divorce awards, custody awards, and procedures such as ADR procedures, arbitration 
and	 settlement	 procedures,	 pre-nuptial	 agreements	 and	 discovery	 and	 secrecy	 orders.	
61 Malinowski,	B	(1945)	The Dynamics of Culture Change: An Inquiry into Race Relations in Africa Yale University Press 
44-45.	First	proposed	by	Max	Rheinstein	in	1937	in	his	article	‘Teaching	Comparative	Law’	5	University of Chicago 
Law Review	617f,	functionality	has	been	generally	accepted	as	a	sound	methodological	principle	of	comparative	law,	
adopted	in	the	classic	work	by	Zweigert,	K	and	Kotz,	H	(1984)	Einfuhrung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des 
Privatrechts	Band	I,	2nd	ed	34.
62 See	Weingast,	BR	(2010)	‘Why	Developing	Countries	Prove	So	Resistant	to	the	Rule	of	Law’	in	Heckman,	JJ	
et al (eds) Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law Routledge 28.
63 See	North,	DC,	Wallis,	 JJ	 and	Weingast,	BR	 (2009)	Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for 
Understanding Recorded Human History Cambridge University Press.
64 See	eg	Merry,	S	(1990)	Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans 
University of Chicago Press; Engel, D and. Engel, JS (2010) Tort, Custom, and Karma: Globalization and Legal 
Consciousness in Thailand Stanford University Press; Engel, D and McCann, M (2009) Fault Lines: Tort Law and 
Cultural Practice Stanford University Press.
65 Banakas,	 S	 (2007)	 ‘A	Global	Concept	of	 Justice:	Dream	or	Nightmare?	Looking	at	Different	Concepts	 of	
Justice	or	Righteousness	Competing	in	Today’s	World’	67	Louisiana Law Review 1021 at 1022f.
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Legal	globalisation	—	especially	global	law	firms	with	an	ability	to	inject	new	dynamism	
into local jurisdictions by importing Anglo-American techniques of pro-active pursuit 
of individual rights empowered by contingency fee agreements, availability of punitive 
damages	and	possibilities	of	forum	shopping	—	has	resulted	in	a	transformation	of	the	
global legal landscape, in which sovereign state borders are failing to provide security 
against liability exposure in a foreign forum. Global private law remedies may include 
transnational procedures of collective redress and class actions. On the bright side, global 
law	firms	are	sometimes	working	pro	bono	in	the	case	of	the	most	serious	and	high	profile	
violations of human rights, empowering disadvantaged individuals while exploiting the 
huge long-term gains in public opinion recognition. 
Additionally, audacious steps are made in several jurisdictions to expand the doctrine 
of	universal	jurisdiction,	either	on	the	basis	that	the	original	forum	offers	inadequate	relief	
or on the basis of the wrong being ‘global’. First, with the advent of the class action and 
other	collective	redress	mechanisms,	lawyers	can	act	as	private	attorneys	general	to	victims	
of mass global wrongs and international mass torts, independent from national political 
pressure, hence enforcing standards of protection of basic human rights equally on a local 
as well as a global basis.66 Second, private law can internationally empower individual 
victims of violations of basic human rights, including family and employment rights, to 
gain not only compensation but also closure and restored dignity.67 
But even beyond basic human rights, global private law remedies can arguably 
be part of the answer to the apparently insoluble problem of extreme deprivation and 
global social welfare. Social welfare, controversial as it is on a national level, becomes a 
moral	conundrum	if	transposed	on	to	the	global	field.68 As the United States experience 
has	shown,	US	tort	law	sometimes	offers	a	safety	net	when	social	welfare	is	inadequate.69 
Whether	private	law	litigation	should	or	should	not,	in	terms	of	economic	efficiency,	be	
used	as	a	mechanism	of	wealth	distribution	on	the	local	level	—	where	tax	laws	might	do	
the	job	better70	—	on	the	global	level	there	is	no	such	alternative.	
For	corporations	across	the	world,	‘hard’	legal	liability	(defined	as	obligations	under	
local,	national	or	international	regulation	or	law)	and	‘soft’	moral	liability	(defined	as	the	
violation of stakeholder expectations of ethical behaviour in such a way as to put business 
value at risk) are converging. The hard legal liability of global corporations has increased 
66 Potential	claimants	are	also	recruited	on	the	internet.	See	eg	http://www.classaction.com/.	Milder	versions	
of the aggressive US model of class actions are now contemplated in Europe. See Fleming, C (2004) ‘Europe 
Learns	Litigious	Ways	—	Union’s	Tactic	 Spotlights	Trend	Toward	US-Style	Lawsuits’	Wall Street Journal 24 
February	at	A16;	Fairgrieve,	D	and	Howells,	G	(2009)	‘Collective	redress	procedures	—	European	debates’	58	
International and Comparative Law Quarterly	379.	In	countries	in	the	French	legal	tradition	with	highly	developed	
systems of administrative (public) tort liability, administrative courts enforce tort claims for violations of 
collective rights: see Henao, JC (2005) ‘Collective Rights and Collective Actions: Samples of European and 
Latin American Contributions’ in Madden, MS (ed) Exploring Tort Law Cambridge University Press 426 on the 
‘acciones populares’, an administrative law remedy that serves functions similar to class actions. For another 
view	of	the	public	function	of	tort	law	in	the	US,	see	Calabresi,	G	(2005)	‘The	Complexity	of	Torts	—	The	case	of	
Punitive	Damages’	in	id	333,	arguing	at	337	that	the	first	function	of	tort	law	is	to	enforce	societal	norms	through	
the	use	of	private	Attorney’s	General.
67 See	Filártiga v Peña-Irala	630	F.2d	876	(2d	Cir	1980).
68 See	Takikawa,	H	 (2005)	 ‘Can	We	 Justify	 the	Welfare	State	 in	an	Age	of	Globalization?	Toward	Complex	
Borders’ in Escamilla and Saavedra Derecho Y Justicia En Una Sociedad Global	supra	n	28	at	723.
69 It	has	been	noted	that	the	weakening	of	Europe’s	welfare	state	has	caused	a	dramatic	increase	in	tort	litigation	
in the Old Continent, leading people to seek their own self-help remedies, often through legal action. 
70 See	Weisbach,	DA	(2003)	‘Should	Legal	Rules	Be	Used	to	Redistribute	Income?’	70	U Chi L Rev	439.
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by the rise of phenomena such as so-called ‘foreign direct liability litigation’ for human 
rights violations in distant geographical locations.71 Criminal and civil liability arising 
from securities litigation has been transformed into a trans-border, global phenomenon, as 
globalisation	of	corporate	capital	carries	with	it	the	jurisdictional	sting	and	influence	of	the	
most demanding national regulatory regimes.
Global jurisdiction for civil liability suits is being tested not only in the US, under the 
old	Alien	Tort	Claims	Act	of	1789,72 but also in Europe. In the case of Lubbe et al v Cape Plc,73 
the	United	Kingdom	House	of	Lords	opened	the	English	courts	to	foreign	plaintiffs	injured	
overseas as a consequence of the operations of British companies or their subsidiaries. And 
the European Court of Justice in Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v Universal General 
Insurance Company74	held	 that	a	plaintiff	domiciled	 in	a	state	 that	was	not	a	contracting	
party to the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments 
in	Civil	and	Commercial	Matters	could	still	invoke	the	rules	of	the	Convention.	It	is	a	safe	
bet that the trend is likely to continue, with other countries, such as Japan and Belgium, 
experiencing lawsuits testing universal jurisdiction for civil liability. 
In response, governments all over the world are rushing in measures to enhance 
national sovereignty in private law claims, such as curbing forum shopping, or the so-
called ‘mosaic principle’,75 in all areas of private law, from divorce to product liability 
and	 libel.	 What	 has	 made	 forum	 shopping	 so	 attractive	 is	 the	 possibility	 of	 lawyers	
pursuing redress for dispersed and sometimes even trivial individual or collective losses 
on behalf of transnational, individual or collective claimants. Two papers presented at 
the	London	workshop	in	2009	were	dedicated	to	this	significant	effect	of	global	wrongs.	
In his thorough review of European Union rules on dispersed individual losses, Lubos 
Tichy76 critically assessed European rules, culminating recently in the EU regulation on 
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (known as ‘Rome II’),77 and the latest 
EU regulation on the jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial	matters.78 His paper showed the complexity of the issue of adjudication of 
claims for globally dispersed injuries caused by one single act or omission, from the point 
71 See	Peter	Muchlinski’s	paper	in	this	volume
72 Resurrected	from	the	dead	in	Filártiga v Peña-Irala	supra	n	67	and	endorsed	by	the	US	Supreme	Court,	albeit	
only	for	a	‘modest’	class	of	suits	based	on	violations	of	the	traditional	law	of	nations	or	other	offences	‘on	a	norm	
of	international	character	accepted	by	the	civilized	world’:	Sosa v Alvarez-Machain 542 US 692 (2004). See also the 
US	Torture	Victims	Protection	Act	of	1992,	providing	a	private	law	remedy	in	a	tort	action	for	‘official	torture’	
and	‘extrajudicial	killing’	committed	under	the	colour	of	foreign	law	on	behalf	of	any	individual,	including	US	
citizens,	but	only	after	the	plaintiff	has	exhausted	all	domestic	remedies,	wherever	they	are.
73 (2000)	4	All	ER	268	(HL)	(appeal	taken	from	Eng)	(UK).	The	decision	allowed	the	claim	for	damages	of	3,000	
South	African	plaintiffs,	who	alleged	that	they	were	made	ill	while	working	with	asbestos	in	the	employment	
of a subsidiary of a UK company. In Berezovsky v Michaels and Others; Glouchkov v Michaels and Others (2000) 
2 All ER 986 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng) (UK), the House of Lords was challenged by inventive counsel to 
decide whether an internationally disseminated libel constituted a number of separate torts in each country of 
publication or whether it should, at least for some purposes, be viewed as a ‘global tort’. 
74 [2000]	ILPr	549	(ECJ);	[2001]	QB	68	[Group	Josi].	See	Ibili,	F	(2006)	‘At	Last:	The	EC	Court	of	Justice	on	Forum	
Non	Conveniens’	53	Neth Int’l L Rev	127.	
75 See	the	ECJ	Shevill	Judgment	(C-68/93).	
76 This	paper	 is	not	published	in	 this	collection	and	will	be	 included	in	a	 future	 larger	collection	of	essays	
presented	at	the	London	Workshop.	Manuscript	available	on	file.
77 EU	Regulation	(EC)	No	846/2007	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council;	this	Regulation,	however,	
and	rather	significantly,	does	not	apply	to	claims	from	alleged	violations	of	personality	and	privacy	rights	(art	
1 para 2 f).
78 EU	Regulation	(EC)	No	44/2001	of	22.12.2000	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council.
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of view of private international law rules and rules on enforcement of foreign judgments, a 
point of view critically relevant when issues of restorative justice are concerned. Criticising 
the	first	path	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice’s	Shevill	judgment,	he	suggested	that	instead	
of the court in the country of establishment of the claimant having jurisdiction to decide on 
the entire dispersed damage in all the other countries, one of the courts (at the discretion 
of the claimant) in one of the countries of occurrence of the damage should have such 
jurisdiction,	preferably	in	the	country	where	the	damage	caused	was	the	most	significant.	
However he retained the second path of Shevill, which limited the jurisdiction of the 
court	 in	 each	of	 the	different	 countries	where	 the	damage	was	dispersed	 to	 adjudicate	
only on local damage. Tichy’s painstaking analysis exposed the degree to which national 
sovereignty issues embedded in traditional private international law rules are re-emerging 
to	create	new	obstacles	to	an	effective	transnational	pursuit	of	dispersed	damage	claims.	
His	 paper	 offered	 plenty	 of	 up-to-date	 evidence	 of	 the	 continuing	 hegemonic	 role	 of	
regionally consolidated private international law rules, but his position, de lege ferenda, is 
very much on the side of progress to a less tethered transnational pursuit of such claims.
The collective dimension of dispersed trivial losses was the focus of Willem H van 
Boom’s contribution to the London workshop. His comprehensive review of doctrine 
and	 practice	 in	 several	 jurisdictions	was	 triggered	 off	 by	 a	 disappointingly	 retrograde	
provision in the recently published European Draft Academic Common Frame of Reference 
(DACFR).79 His look at the long list of collective redress remedies and procedures in several 
countries reveals the degree to which innovative collective redress practices are gaining 
ground in jurisdictions other than the common law ones, changing traditional private law 
thinking in so-called civil law countries and beyond. In the light of this, van Boom rightly 
concluded that contemporary private law needs to change its traditional view of dispersed 
trifle	 losses.	He	also	agreed	 that	an	 issue	of	such	complexity	should	not	be	decided	by	
diktat of a regional hegemony, such as the EU,80 preventing natural evolution of private 
law remedies and procedures in each jurisdiction. But the EU’s DACFR represents one of 
several	recent	efforts	in	a	number	of	major	domestic	jurisdictions	that	led	the	first	wave	of	
legal globalisation to reassert legal sovereignty under international law and international 
private law, and curb the erosive expansion of private law remedies and procedures in 
the pursuit of out-of-jurisdiction claims. In this context, global legal entrepreneurism 
and judicial activism is viewed by certain governments and domestic law-makers as a 
potent	enemy	to	political	sovereignty	and	indigenous	legal	culture.	In	this	they	often	find	
powerful allies in multinational corporations that are exposed to an increasingly aggressive 
and imaginative trans-border assault by private law litigants. The outcome of this contest, 
especially	in	the	light	of	the	experience	of	the	recent	global	financial	crisis,	is	unclear.
79 ‘Trivial	damage	is	to	be	disregarded’:	ADCFR	art	VI-6:102	(De minimis rule). More on ADCFR in Banakas, 
S	(forthcoming)	‘Harmonization	of	European	Private	Law:	Out	of	Date,	Out	of	Time?’	Oxford Comparative Law 
Forum.
80 On	the	retrograde	‘neo-colonial’	strategy	of	the	EU	as	a	regional	(Western)	hegemony	that	goes	against	the	
grain of globalisation, see more in ibid.
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PRIVATE LAW REMEDIES: AVAILABLE TO ALL?
What is clearer, however, is that in the wake of the enthusiasm about the potential of 
private law remedies and procedures to empower individuals against powerful state 
authorities and even more powerful public and private corporations worldwide, and to 
enforce	individual	rights,	not	enough	attention	is	paid	to	the	fact	that	private	law	remedies	
and procedures are, like a harlot, available to everyone.81 Governments and public and 
private	corporations	can	also	be	plaintiffs	in	private	law	suits,	and	can	maximise	to	their	
interests the use of remedies and procedures. Thus, mighty pharmaceutical corporations 
can use an avalanche of discovery orders to debilitate press investigations into their 
products and intimidate journalists and private victims of their actions, by intruding into 
journalists’ private sources or even into their private lives. Corporations can sue for libel 
and get punitive damages. So, too, can individuals suspected of human rights violations 
that have been exposed or prosecuted unsuccessfully. Torturers and tortured, both have 
private law rights. 
But, to what extent are private law remedies and procedures truly available to all? 
Again,	not	enough	attention	is	paid	to	the	legal	status	of	the	large,	almost	impossible	to	
calculate, numbers of individuals who belong to non-legitimised immigrant communities 
all over the globe, part of the so-called clandestine global population movement. For them, 
living in legal and social exclusion and legally not existing in the country in which they 
find	themselves,	private	law	remedies	and	procedures	are	only	a	threat,	never	an	option	
of empowerment, and private law, especially property law, has become one of the faces of 
what	Boaventura	de	Sousa	Santos	has	called	‘financial	fascism’.82 Indeed, the globalisation 
of Western-designed private law remedies can be easily criticised as spearheading the task 
of advancing a hegemonic, neoliberal, almost neocolonial, ‘top-down’ legal globalisation. 
For people living in social exclusion, seeking to enforce private rights implies emerging 
from lawlessness to self-destruction. Non-legitimised migrant groups only ever encounter 
private law, especially property law, as an external threat rather than a possible recourse. 
Such groups often turn inward to forms of self-legitimising, counter-hegemonic,83 tribal or 
communal justice. 
Indeed, so-called ‘global’ private law remedies, as exclusively Western-produced 
devices, can potentially overpower other private law cultures or genetically modify them 
(so-called	Islamic	finance	devices	 is	an	example84), thus perpetuating and consolidating 
Western legal ‘neo-colonialism’ and a monistic, neoliberal, Western-Westphalian legal 
thinking. The national, monistic Westphalian sovereign state becomes a transnational 
one, in which, even for liberal, enlightened social scientists like Thomas Nagel85 or iconic 
multi-cultural celebrities like Amartya Sen,86 the best hope for global justice is still placed 
in emerging institutions and processes of an exclusively Western-Westphalian design, 
81 Expression	borrowed	 from	Ross,	A	 (1959)	On Law and Justice University of California Press 261: ‘Like a 
harlot, natural law is at the disposal of everyone’.
82 de	Sousa	Santos	‘The	Counter-Hegemonic	Use	of	Law’	supra	n	28	at	405.	
83 See	the	powerful	account	in	id	at	435.
84 See	supra	n	17.
85 Nagel,	T	(2005)	‘The	Problem	of	Global	Justice’	33	Phil & Pub Aff	113	at	146-47.
86 Sen,	A	(2001)	 ‘Global	 Justice	Beyond	International	Equity’	Polylog  available at http://them.polylog.org/3/
fsa-en.htm (last visited 8 July 2010). 
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driven by Western initiatives, and all arguments about justice and fairness must engage 
with	Western	liberal	or	neo-liberal	thinking,	such	as	that	of	John	Rawls	or	Robert	Nozick.	
Other legal cultures, old, rich and potentially rewarding, must submit to Western legal 
superiority	to	be	accepted	into	global	legal	and	financial	networks.	In	Western	jurisdictions,	
any initiative towards legal pluralism in private law is resisted by worried politicians 
reacting to increasing xenophobia in the wake of mass population movements, cultivated 
by the mass media (another Western hegemonic tool exported globally). 
Recent debates in the UK on the right of Islamic private law to exist as a modest 
alternative	for	consenting	Muslims,	supervised	by	the	courts,	 in	matters	of	divorce	and	
inheritance,	show	very	little	tolerance	for	legal	pluralism,87 and the situation is similar in 
France, Germany, Italy and the US. Religious personal status private law is used by ethnic 
communities in Western, and sometimes also non-Western, countries in a clandestine, 
unregulated	way,	and	the	contrast	with	the	power	of	the	official	law	is	used	to	undermine	its	
authority.	Resentment	and	conflict	follow.	Furthermore,	non-Western	societies	and	states	
are obliged to learn and adopt Western legal practice, or use Western lawyers, to service 
their	participation	in	global	legal	and	financial	networks,	as	shown	by	the	vast	amounts	
of GDP spent by developing countries to service their membership of the World Trade 
Organisation and other global organisations. Legal globalisation, spearheaded by Western 
private law rights and remedies can thus appear as a new Western legal colonialism.88 
The recent European DACFR is a worrying example of Western naked ambition in this 
direction.89
Despite all this, it is important to acknowledge the reality on the ground: Western-
inspired remedies and procedures, used by a willing judiciary, remain a realistic means 
of enforcing individual and community rights. Public interest litigation for example, a 
Western-inspired	procedure,	has	proved	an	effective	way	of	promoting	social	 justice	 in	
legally pluralist countries such as India,90 or for marginalised and excluded communities 
such as the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe.91 But as pointed out by Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos,92 courts of law can only be galvanised into action if driven by various kinds 
87 See	 Tahir,	A	 ‘Revealed:	 UK’s	 First	 Official	 Sharia	 courts’	 at	 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/
faith/article4749183.ece	(last	visited	8	July	2010).	See	also	the	official	site	of	the	UK	Islamic	Sharia	Council	at	
http://www.islamic-sharia.org/	(last	visited	8	July	2010).	
88 See	Silvia,	SJ	and	Sampson,	AB	(2005)	‘The	Acquis	Communautaire:	An	Extension	of	European	Colonialist	
Values?” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC, 1-4 September. 
89 ‘Europe	 is	 the	home	 continent	 of	private	 law.	We	as	 a	Union	 should	have	 something	on	offer	not	 only	
because so many of our own national private law systems are hopelessly outdated, but because other parts 
of the world are looking at us as well and wondering whether we can convincingly contribute to their needs 
to	modernize	their	private	law	systems.	Europe	had	not	much	to	say	when	Russia	looked	for	something	non-
American;	Africa	is	suffering	from	a	lack	of	 justice;	China	is	working	on	a	Civil	Code.	Lawyers	from	Korea,	
Japan, China and other countries in that region are thinking of founding a Commission on East Asian Contract 
Law aiming at the formulation of Principles of East Asian Contract law’: Chr V Bar (2008) ‘A Common Frame 
of	 Reference	 for	 European	 Private	 Law	—	Academic	 Efforts	 and	 Political	 Realities’	 in	 Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law Vol. 12.1 (May).
90 See	Baxi,	U	(1985)		‘Taking	Suffering	Seriously:	Social	Action	Litigation	in	the	Supreme	Court	of	India’	in	
Dhavan, R, Sudarsan, R and Khurshid, S (eds) Judges and the Judicial Power, Essays in Honour of Justice V R Krishna 
Iyer	Sweet	&	Maxwell	289.
91 See	Goldston,	JA	and	Adjami,	M	(2010)	‘The	Opportunities	and	Challenges	of	using	Public	Interest	Litigation	
to	secure	Access	to	Justice	for	Roma	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe’	in	Ghai,	Y	and	Cottrell,	J	(eds)	Marginalized 
Communities and Access to Justice	Taylor	&	Francis.
92 de	Sousa	Santos,	B	(1995)	Towards a New Common Sense-Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition 
Routledge.
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of assorted political action, not only, one might add, by lawyers’ ambition and greed. The 
legendary Indian Justice Krishna Iyer, who was the protagonist in the surge of Indian 
public	interest	litigation,	admitted	as	much	in	a	striking	comment:	‘The	avant-garde	jurists	
…, the “robed” radicals who claim through judicial surgery and epistolary lancet, to 
liberate bonded labor, terminate social injustice and accelerate economic egalite through 
writs of court … are playing the game within the bourgeois parameters. The great issues 
of meaning and moment are in the streets, on the hills, on the city pavements….’93 It is not 
impossible, therefore, as both the Indian experience of radical public interest litigation, 
and	also	 that	of	Brazil,	have	shown,	 to	 transform	through	combined	 legal	and	political	
action an essentially hegemonic institution like that of Western-style courts into a counter-
hegemonic tool.
PRIVATE LAW REMEDIES, PUBLIC WRONGS AND THE GLOBAL 
DIMENSIONS OF THE LOCAL: A NEW COMPLEXITY
Global wrongs are not only caused by Western hegemonic forces in non-Western 
countries;	they	are	also	caused	in	Western	countries	themselves.	Hegemonic	patterns	of	
access to justice and dispute resolution have been applied indiscriminately in Western and 
non-Western societies, and this can be directly linked to the rise of public law doctrine 
(both national and international) in the last two centuries, as a necessary corollary to the 
Westphalian state sovereignty model. Hegemonic uses of the rule of law are not restricted 
to a Western over non-Western, rich-North over poor-South, variety. A measure of a 
person’s liberation from the shackles of modern hegemonic public law doctrine94 is the 
advance of private law remedies and procedures into territory traditionally considered 
as the reserve of public law. Maria Frederica Moscati’s article in this collection illustrates 
how public law hegemony can restrict the access to justice of minorities in fully developed 
Western legal cultures, by looking at the issue of the lack of direct access of Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Transgender individuals (LGBT) to the Italian Constitutional Court for 
violations of their constitutional rights. Her article shows the Italian legal system, with 
its fully entrenched procedural acceptance of the rule of law, lagging seriously behind 
even some non-Western jurisdictions, often accused of an ambivalent position on rule of 
law issues. As she points out, some non-Western legal cultures like India, South Africa 
and	Nepal	offer	effective	protection	to	minorities	such	as	LGBT	by	allowing	direct	access	
to the Supreme Constitutional Court. The struggle of LGBT people for direct access to 
Italy’s Constitutional court is, of course, as much of a wrong, as any such discrimination 
in a non-Western, limited access society. As she says: ‘Individual autonomy can be an 
important resource for the development of remedies against public wrongs. Unfortunately, 
individual autonomy is often limited by the absence of a legal framework supporting civil 
rights,	or	by	political	influence	on	the	courts.’	
The global dimensions of local public wrongs, the exploitation of the hegemonic 
nature of Western concepts of the rule of law not only by majorities but also by dictatorial 
minorities, and the redeeming potential of these features in a complex, post-modernist 
93 Krisha	Iyer,	Justice	VR	(1987)	Our Courts on Trial	BR	Pub	Corp	136.
94 To	paraphrase	Rousseau,	J-J	(1762)	The Social Contract Book I, ch 1: Man is born free, and everywhere he is 
in chains.
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global environment are shown in Elisa Nesossi’s paper on Falun Gong members’ claims 
in the US under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) for human rights violations in China. 
Public international law often provides for criminal sanctions for violations of human 
rights, but does not explicitly sanction civil law suits. Civil suits for violations of human 
rights, primarily tort actions that are, moreover, primarily a US creation, often exist in 
conflict	with	public	international	law	that	adopts	such	violations	from	a	top-down,	public	
law position, because, obviously, they challenge this position and the doctrine of state 
sovereignty, which remains sacrosanct as far as public international law is concerned. 
But Nesossi also asks a further question: are tort remedies marginal in terms of their 
global impact, an imperfect sui generis creation of the US legal system? It is true that they 
come with all the unique features of American tort law culture and process, conveniently 
summarised in a comparative analysis of ATCA litigation95 as class actions,96 contingency 
fees, the possibility of award of punitive damages by juries, default judgments, simple 
discovery rules and the residual jurisdiction of US Federal courts to adjudicate on 
disputes	 that	 fall	 within	 the	 subject-matter	 of	 the	 US	 Constitution	 regardless	 of	 their	
country of origin. But American tort law has long ceased to be an insular phenomenon 
and its global importance is enhanced by the American-dominated global legal practice. 
Criticisms advanced against the use of tort law in cases of serious violations of human 
rights, referred to in Nessossi’s	article,	include	‘an	affront	against	all	of	humanity	has	been	
reduced	to	an	issue	of	money	and	financial	compensation’,	‘the	defendant	does	not	face	
imprisonment and does not face the wrath of the entire community, as represented by 
a government prosecutor’,97 and ‘tort law prices, while criminal law prohibits’.98 These 
criticisms overstate the case for state-led criminal prosecutions and public international 
law regimes of international criminal proceedings. Apart from underestimating the very 
important prohibitive function of damages awards, especially potentially hefty punitive 
damages awards, such criticisms ignore the fact that in national or international criminal 
proceedings victims have no control over, or input in, the process, and their personal 
vindication is not on the agenda. And often such proceedings are not available to them, 
precisely because they depend on national or international political expediency. Private 
law remedies are often the only protectors of human dignity. Nessossi’s research backs 
this up. As she points out:
The ATCA lawsuits have brought into the spotlight individual victims of human 
rights violations, whose voice would not have been heard in any other legal forums. 
In the cases brought by the Falun Gong followers, as in many other similar cases, the 
victims did not look at civil actions only with the object of obtaining compensation. 
Civil action has often had a symbolic rather than a compensatory objective. Not 
being able to confront the governmental authorities in China and get any kind of 
95 Stephens,	 B	 (2002)	 ‘Translating	 Filártiga:	 A	 Comparative	 and	 International	 Law	Analysis	 of	 Domestic	
Remedies	for	International	Human	Rights	Violations’	27	Yale International Law Journal 1 at 14.
96 No	longer	an	American	exclusive:	see	eg	Fairgrieve,	D	and	Howells,	G	(2009)	‘Collective	Redress	Procedures	
—	European	Debates’	58	International and Comparative Law Quarterly	379;	Note	(1997-98)	‘Class	Action	Litigation	
in China’ 111 Harvard Law Revies	1523;	Gidi,	A	(2003)	‘Class	Actions	in	Brazil	—	a	Model	for	Civil	Law	Countries	
51 American Journal of  Comparative Law	311.	See	also	Willem	van	Boom’s	paper	in	this	volume.
97 Stephens	‘Translating	Filártiga’	supra	n	95	at	12.
98 Coffee,	 JC	 (1991)	 ‘Does	 “Unlawful”	 Mean	 “Criminal”?	 Reflections	 on	 the	 Disappearing	 Tort/Crime	
Distinction	in	American	Law’	71	Boston University Law Review	193	at	194.
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formal admission of gross wrongdoing by the PRC authorities, the victims saw the 
enforcement of civil remedies as the only available procedural avenue for securing 
self-respect, vindication and recognition as victims of human rights abuses.
Francesco	 Schiaffo’s	 article	 on	 the	 reform	 of	 self-defence	 in	 Italy	 in	 2006	 shows	 an	
example of creative ways of outsourcing core public law functions to private action, 
opening up the intriguing question of privatising the right of punishment in a traditional 
Western jurisdiction. Other legal traditions, such as the Shari’a, have always accepted the 
private right of the victim to demand retribution or forgive.99 As Professor Hassan Ko 
Nakata puts it, in Islamic law there is no distinction between public and private law, but a 
distinction between laws concerning acts of worship (ibadaat) and laws concerning human 
affairs	(muamalat). And he adds that in Islamic law, ‘murder is a civil case rather than a 
criminal case’.100 In my view, an imaginative interpretation of the Italian legislation could 
serve to open the debate, long overdue, of the lessons that could be learned by Western 
legal traditions from other traditions, such as that of Islam, in managing wrongs against 
individuals	and	achieving	restorative	 justice.	Be	 that	as	 it	may,	Schiaffo’s	article	 shows	
how contemporary social and economic challenges can lead to expanding the reach of 
private law rights into domains traditionally governed by state-enforced criminal (public) 
law. 
Michael	Palmer’s	article	offers	an	important,	if	different,	dimension	of	the	phenomenon	
of privatisation of traditional public law jobs, informed by alternative dispute resolution 
developments	 in	a	non-Western	legal	 tradition	of	enormous	significance	in	a	globalised	
world: the Chinese legislation and practice of mediation in administrative proceedings. As 
he	points	out,	this	‘reflects	more	than	simply	the	influences	of	traditional	Chinese	culture,	
lax procedural rules, the self interest of the parties and a general shift in development 
policy’, but is also the product of present political reality, the decision of the current 
paramount leader Hu Jintao ‘to pursue … the developmental goal of a “harmonious 
society”, with Party and state joined at the hip’.
Private	law	remedies	always	existed	in	tension,	and	sometimes	in	conflict,	with	public	
laws, aiming at serving the sovereignty of states. They have always been in every tradition 
more or less independently available to individuals and, and more importantly, judges. 
The	latter	always	saw	themselves	as	primary	guardians	of	individual	private	rights,	but	
have also always been restricted by constitutional principles of separation of powers 
and doctrines of judicial review and legality of executive action in applying public law. 
Sometimes, as the experience of legal traditions as diverse as those of Western civil law 
systems, modern Chinese law, Islamic law and the PIL jurisprudence in India, shows, 
private law remedies empower courts to defy not only national but also international 
sovereignty. But Palmer also provides important evidence and makes a strong and very 
important argument that the privatisation of public wrongs will also throw issues into 
the	ADR	arena	in	many	jurisdictions	around	the	world	today.	ADR	offers	a	private	law-
99 See	 among	 others,	 Dien,	 MI	 (2004)	 Islamic Law: From Historical Foundations To Contemporary Practice 
University of Notre Dame Press.
100 Preface	to	Introduction	to	Public and Private Law of Islam — Part of Public Law (in Japanese, published by 
Japan-Saudi	Arabia	 Society	 2008)	 available	 online	 at	 http://homepage3.nifty.com/hasankonakata/hassanpdf/
characteristicofpubliclawinislam2.pdf	(last	visited	8	July	2010).	See	also	Mallat,	C	(ed)	(1993)	Islam and Public 
Law (Arab and Islamic Laws) Springer Verlag.
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driven alternative to the autocracy of justice by state-appointed judges. It is to aggrieved 
citizens	what	tort	law	is	to	the	victims	of	a	crime.	Heroic	as	it	may	be,	the	contribution	of	
official	courts	in	certain	developing	societies	(such	as	in	Brazil	or	India),	is	questionable,	as	
Michael Palmer points out:
In well-established democracies, with securely institutionalised political 
party	 systems,	 firmly	 embedded	 rule	 of	 law	values,	 a	 free	 press	 and	 a	 strongly	
autonomous and vibrant civil society, judicial review may be seen as something 
of	a	double-edged	sword.	While	it	may	bring	benefits	in	holding	powerful	public	
institutions to account, it also raises a fundamental question about the legitimacy 
of the courts’ decision-making authority. Why should an unelected body such as 
a	court	possess	the	right	to	challenge	definitively	the	decisions	of	a	legislature	or	a	
government that is popularly elected and which may be readily criticised or held 
to account in other ways?
And	as	Antonio	Lazari	points	out	 in	his	essay	 ‘The	Ulysses’	 Intertwined	Ropes:	 the	
European Law Remedies and the New Cross-Fertilisation Paradigm’,101 
After	the	birth	of	the	European	Communities,	the	state	did	not	change	its	attitude,	as	
Jean Monnet had hoped. Its approach to the European Communities is traditionally 
internationalist. It is through private law remedies that the Court of Justice brings 
the political will of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe within a legal 
framework	by	virtue	of	its	first	sentences	from	the	1960s.	
Lazari’s	 article	 offers	 an	 important	 example	 of	 considerable	 transnational	 impact	
of private law’s emergence as a powerful ‘third way’ in transnational legal relations, in 
conflict	with	national	constitutions	and	international	treaties,	an	example	of	the	outcome	
of what he calls the ‘fruitful conversation’ of ordinary (private law) courts in EU member 
states with the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The outcome has been an original and 
quite important development for the future of Europe, the direct applicability of EU 
Treaty provisions in defence of private rights, and the doctrine of state liability in tort for 
failure to implement properly European harmonisation measures,102 and, most recently, 
also core treaty provisions on competition wrongs.103	As	Lazari	points	out,	although	the	
ECJ	has	denied	‘direct	effect’	 to	provisions	of	GATT	and	WTO	law,	it	has	extended	the	
judicial conversation to the WTO tribunals in Geneva. Most important of all is the broader 
101 This	paper	is	not	published	in	this	collection	and	will	be	included	in	a	future	larger	collection	of	essays	
presented	at	the	London	Workshop.	Manuscript	available	on	file.
102 Francovich and Bonifaci v Republic of Italy	(Cases	C-6	and	9/90)	[1991]	ECR	I-5375;	Brasserie du Pêcheur v Federal 
Republic of Germany and R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd	(Cases	C-46	and	C-48/93)	[1996]	
ECR I-1029.
103 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA (C-295/04), Antonio Cannito v Fondiaria Sai SpA (C-
296/04), Nicolò Tricarico v Assitalia SpA	 (C-297/04)	 and	Pasqualina Murgolo v Assitalia SpA.(C-298/04), Joined 
Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04) (2006). The EJC held that ‘article 81 EC must be interpreted as meaning that any 
individual can rely on the invalidity of an agreement or practice prohibited under that article and, where there 
is	a	causal	relationship	between	the	latter	and	the	harm	suffered,	claim	compensation	for	that	harm’.	See	more	
in Mackenrodt, M-O, Gallego, BC and Enchelmaier, S (eds) (2008) Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, 
New Enforcement Mechanisms? Springer Verlag. See also EU Commission (2008) White Paper ‘Damages Actions for 
Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules’,	COM	165	final	at	1ff.
JCL 4:2           23
	 stathis	banakas
significance	 of	 such	 developments:	 this	 ‘conversation’	 between	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 in	
(horizontally	as	well	as	vertically)	different	 juridical	orders,	National,	transnational	and	
international,	 and	 across	 different	 political	 ideologies,	 legal	 cultures	 and	 languages,	 a	
conversation about individual private law remedies, is in fact changing the world in a 
way that cannot be controlled by traditional structures of national and international 
sovereignty.104 In its Kadi judgment, the ECJ, overturning the judgment of the court of 
first	 instance,105 defended the private right to property against the EU Commission’s 
regulation106 enforcing UN Security Council anti-terrorism resolutions, and adopting a 
blacklist, periodically updated, of persons alleged to be linked to terrorist organisations. 
In accordance with resolutions of the Security Council, all state members of the United 
Nations	 must	 freeze	 the	 funds	 and	 other	 financial	 resources	 controlled	 directly	 or	
indirectly by such persons or entities. Kadi, a resident of Saudi Arabia, and the Al Barakaat 
International Foundation, established in Sweden, were designated by the Sanctions 
Committee	of	the	United	Nations	as	being	associated	with	Usama	bin	Laden,	Al-Qaeda	or	
the Taleban. Their names were added to the summary blacklist of the UN, and then placed 
in	the	similar	list	annexed	to	the	Community	regulation.	The	ECJ	held	that	the	freezing	
of	his	 funds	constituted	an	unjustified	restriction	of	Mr	Kadi’s	 right	 to	property,107 and 
annulled	the	Council	regulation	insofar	as	it	freezed	Mr	Kadi	and	Al	Barakaat’s	funds.108
Chris Wadlow’s contribution re-launches the same inquiry beyond Europe, into a 
global perspective, looking into issues of interface between private law rights, human 
rights and intellectual property transnational legal regimes. His article illuminates the new 
complexity created on a global level by the inventive use of private law remedies in areas 
of	grievance	and	conflict	that	sometimes	appear	to	be	squarely	governed	by	international	
law.	His	article	looks	into	the	possible	function	of	the	International	Centre	for	the	Settlement	
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) as adjudicator of private claims against sovereign states, 
arising from the control and allocation of intellectual property rights in bilateral (or 
regional) investment treaties (BITs). Provided, as he says, one can see intellectual property 
rights as investment, the ICSID could be engaged by private parties to resolve disputes 
arising from BITs. As he points out, ICSID could well be a ‘magic word’ that opens a 
‘portal’ or ‘wormhole’ between the public international law of states and the private law 
of persons. One might add ECJ or ATCA as other potential portals or wormholes. In any 
case,	regardless	of	spaces	of	an	alternative	legal	order	or	legality,	private	law	offers	the	
possibility of a new global language of entitlement in the form of self-legitimising action 
channelled through courts inspired by radical political movements, defying the Babel of 
separate sovereign legal orders, legal cultures and languages, contributing to the invention 
104 ECJ	Joined	Cases	C-402/05	P	and	C-415/05	P	(2008).
105 Judgments	of	21	September	2005	in	Case	T-306/01	Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council 
and	Case	T-315/01	Kadi v Council and Commission.
106 Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	881/2002	of	27	May	2002	imposing	certain	specific	restrictive	measures	directed	
against	certain	persons	and	entities	associated	with	Usama	bin	Laden,	the	Al-Qaeda	network	and	the	Taliban,	
and	repealing	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	467/2001	(OJ	2002	L	139	p	9).	
107 Protected	by	the	European	Convention	of	Human	Rights,	article	1	of	Protocol	No	1.
108 ‘The	imposition	of	the	restrictive	measures	laid	down	by	that	regulation	in	respect	of	a	person	or	entity,	by	
including	him	or	it	in	the	list	…,	constitutes	an	unjustified	restriction	of	the	right	to	property,	for	that	regulation	
was adopted without furnishing any guarantee enabling that person or entity to put his or its case to the 
competent	authorities,	in	a	situation	in	which	the	restriction	of	property	rights	must	be	regarded	as	significant,	
having	regard	to	the	general	application	and	actual	continuation	of	the	restrictive	measures	affecting	him	or	it’:	
ECJ	Joined	Cases	C-402/05	P	and	C-415/05	P	(2008),	paras	368-70.
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of a new grammar of space and time for a new global political culture.109 To expand on 
Wadlow’s	 allegory,	 private	 law	 could	 become	 itself	 a	 portal	 wide	 open,	 a	 bottomless	
wormhole.
Ting Xu’s paper on the right to private property and its enforcement in the People’s 
Republic of China also shows the power of private law and the seductive appeal of 
private entitlement to penetrate political space dominated in China by the powerful 
post-Mao party and state ideology. As Xu points out, in China the private (si) has long 
been considered inferior to the public (gong). It has taken a long gradual development 
of a notion of private ownership, necessitated by China’s decision to join unequivocally 
financial	 globalisation	 and	 to	welcome	 foreign	 investment,	 to	 reach	 the	 Property	 Law	
Act	that	came	into	effect	in	2007.110This	Act	defines	private	ownership	as	an	absolute	and	
supreme	right	 in	China,	equally	protected	as	public	property,	and	seemingly	offers	 the	
possibility of providing ordinary people with civil law remedies for infringements of 
private property rights. But as Xu points out, such remedies are still not available when the 
public power requisitions privately owned land on grounds of ‘public interest’ (gonggong 
liyi), a concept the meaning of which is not clear, in either the Chinese Constitution111 or 
the Property Law Act. However, and despite Xu’s reservations as to the present state of 
enforcement of private property rights in China, her thorough and perceptive account of 
the development of private property law in China reveals more than a glimmer of hope 
that such enforcement may soon be fully institutionalised. As she says in her conclusion: 
‘The	process	of	 lawmaking	in	China	shows	a	pattern	in	which	“reality”	pushes	the	law	
to reform, and it struggles to strike a balance between party policy and law as well as 
between central and local law-making’. This yielding to reality rather than faithfully 
adhering	to	the	institutional	status	quo	is	exemplified	in	a	remarkable	way	by	events	in	
1987,	when	a	party-approved	auction	of	land	use	rights	took	place	in	Shenzhen	despite	
this being against the Constitution at the time; this was duly amended to legitimise the 
practice four months later. Xu’s article does illustrate that this post-legitimisation culture 
is complex, and it needs to be seen in the context of the relationship between law and party 
policy, as well as the relation between the central and local governments in the process of 
lawmaking.	Nevertheless,	financial	globalisation	and	China’s	perceived	goal	to	be	in	the	
centre	of	it	as	an	emerging	financial	superpower	is	a	very	powerful	reality	driving	on	party	
policy on private property rights. 
The enforcement of private property rights, so essential in Western neo-liberal thinking, 
and	a	sine	qua	non	condition	of	financial	globalisation,	offers	a	sharp	illustration	of	the	
double-edged nature of private law remedies, especially, but not only, in non-Western 
societies, and it is at the centre of what Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls ‘abyssal thinking’, 
the	modern	Western	thinking	driving	globalization.112 Historically, as shown by, among 
others, Pagden,113 Western colonial powers were more concerned with legitimating 
109 See	de	Sousa	Santos,	B	(2006)	A Gramática Do Tempo: Para Unha NovaCultura Política Edições Afrontamento.
110 Passed	by	the	National	People’s	Congress	on	16	March	2007	and	in	force	since	1	October	2007.	
111 Article	13	of	the	Chinese	Constitution	(amended	in	2004)	states:	 ‘The	lawful	private	property	of	citizens	
may	not	be	encroached	upon.	By	law,	the	state	protects	citizens’	rights	to	own	private	property	and	the	rights	to	
inherit	private	property.	The	state	may,	for	the	public	interest,	acquire	or	requisition	citizen’s	private	property	
for public use, and pay compensation in accordance with law’.
112 de	Sousa	Santos	‘Beyond	Abyssal	Thinking’	supra	n	1.
113 Pagden,	A	(1990)	Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination Yale University Press.
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property rights than sovereignty over the New World, and one might add that this is 
also	 true	 in	 the	process	of	financial	globalisation.	Santos	goes	as	 far	 as	 suggesting	 that	
underneath contemporary globalisation is the continuing existence of an invisible division 
between	metropolitan	societies	and	colonial	territories,	two	different	political	paradigms,	
the former resting on a tension between social regulation and social emancipation, the 
latter	on	a	tension	between	appropriation	and	violence.114 Appropriation and (or through) 
violence is at the heart of property rights, private or public, causes social and legal 
exclusion, and is therefore also in the heart of the global justice debate.
PRIVATE LAW REMEDIES, CORPORATE WRONGS AND THE LOCAL 
DIMENSIONS OF THE GLOBAL
The reason for which private law remedies cross frontiers in the case of corporate wrongs, 
in the form of what has been described as ‘foreign direct liability’,115	is	different	from	that	
in the case of public wrongs. Unlike sovereign states and governments, multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) do not have sovereign power nor are they normally covered by 
any public international law immunities. But, as Rachel Chambers succinctly observes, 
business-related human rights abuses are primarily enabled by the misalignment between 
economic forces and governance capacity in the host country. Moreover, global corporate 
activity often challenges local legal resources,116 even supposing that governments of 
host countries are willing to go after human rights violations, and are neither corrupt nor 
impotent	before	global	corporate	might.	So	there	are	two	important	issues	here:	first,	the	
ability of global corporate might to dictate favourable local terms to impotent or corrupt 
host governments; and second, the absence of legal and technical resources in developing 
countries. 
Catherine Jenkins’s article on litigating South African apartheid claims against 
multinational companies in US courts strongly supports this, especially in her conclusion 
that ‘US courts may often be the last hope of redress for the victims of abusive pasts’, although, 
she adds, ‘it remains to be seen whether they will prove able to write “good history”.’ But 
her article clearly shows the potential of private law remedies and procedures in general, 
and tort law in particular, not only to achieve restorative justice but also to establish facts, 
important for healing and global human rights progress. The ‘jurisprudence of hope’117 
may now become also the ‘jurisprudence of truth’. The creative use in the US by certain 
federal jurisdictions of the Alien Tort Claims Act has allowed transnational lawsuits to 
vindicate violations of human rights in other jurisdictions.118 This development compares 
very favourably with the creative use in other jurisdictions of procedures such as the PIL 
procedure in India, discussed above. But the South African experience as presented in 
114 de	Sousa	Santos	‘Beyond	Abyssal	Thinking’	supra	n	1	at	2.
115 Ward,	 H	 (2001)	 ‘Governing	Multinationals:	 The	 Role	 of	 Foreign	 Direct	 Liability’	 The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, Briefing Paper	New	Series	No	 18	 February,	 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3028_
roleoffdl.pdf	(last	visited	8	June	2010).
116 In	Lubbe v Cape	[2000]	1	WLR	1545	(HL),	the	House	of	Lords,	applying	the	principles	on	forum non conveniens 
laid down in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987]	AC	460	(HL),	accepted	jurisdiction	on	a	dispute	arising	
from events in South Africa on the grounds that a case of that magnitude required expert legal representation 
and experts on technical and medical issues that could not be funded in South Africa. 
117 Quoting	Lambert,	‘The	Jurisprudence	of	Hope’	supra	n	11.
118 See	more	in	my	paper	‘A	Global	Concept	of	Justice’	supra	n	65.
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Jenkins’s article reveals a number of collateral issues that show the limits and, conceivably, 
also	potential	drawbacks	of	transnational	private	law	suits	for	the	effective	protection	of	
human rights. Perhaps conveniently, the South African government refused to support 
the apartheid litigation, conscious of the fact that multinational corporations complicit 
in past wrongs would be needed in the post-transition reconstruction of the country’s 
economy and society. Furthermore, no South African multinationals were included in the 
lawsuits and banks were granted immunity from liabilities. Jenkins makes the important 
point	that	transnational	lawsuits	create	a	lot	of	difficulties,	material	as	well	as	cultural	and	
moral,	 for	often	poor	and	uneducated	plaintiffs	represented	by	foreign	lawyers	in	alien	
jurisdictions,	where	officials	may	have	little	or	no	understanding	of	the	background.	But	to	
what	extent	do	these	difficulties	limit	the	potential	of	such	lawsuits	to	be	an	effective	form	
of ‘restorative’ justice, and achieve real ‘closure’ besides monetary compensation? Often 
tort	suits	are	brought	with	a	clear	aim	of	reaching	an	out-of-court	settlement,	which	may	
provide monetary reparation and pay the lawyers’ expenses but will certainly not lead to 
any kind of ‘truth’ or ‘closure’ for the victims. Jenkins’s article leaves the question open 
of whether or not the availability of transnational private remedies is a curse rather than 
a	blessing,	preventing	 the	 states	and	communities	affected,	 as	well	 as	 the	 international	
community, from addressing the issue of gross and systematic human rights violations 
globally	and	holistically,	and	putting	in	place	an	international	scheme	of	reparations	under	
the	auspices	of	public	international	law.	This	is	a	point	of	major,	broader	significance	for	
the debate on the contribution of private law remedies and procedures to global justice. 
But	she	also	is	right	in	drawing	a	mildly	optimistic	final	conclusion:	transnational	private	
law suits may be all we have and can realistically expect in the near future. 
Rachel	Chamber’s	article	on	home	state	litigation	as	a	way	to	fill	the	lacuna	in	corporate	
legal accountability for human rights violations perpetrated in host states demonstrates 
that home state litigation, or, as it is also known, ‘foreign direct liability’, remains one of 
the few tools for vindicating human rights violations and therefore, despite its limitations, 
it	could	be	an	important	step	towards	filling	the	lacuna	in	corporate	legal	accountability	
for human rights violations perpetrated in host states. But her research also reveals the 
broader	significance	of	home	private	 litigation	 for	corporate	abuses	of	human	rights	 in	
host countries: scarce as it may be, it could lay the seeds for the development of a principle 
of universal jurisdiction for human rights violations based on the avoidance of a denial of 
justice.119 
However, as Peter Muchlinski shows in his review of foreign direct liability cases, the 
prospect of denial of justice does not always tip the balance in favour of claimants. Claims 
arising from the Bhopal disaster in India, resulting from the activities of the US-owned 
MNE, Union Carbide, were denied a hearing in the US.120 One is tempted to take a rather 
cynical view of the future of foreign direct liability in US courts when the MNE is primarily 
119 A	natural	 law	principle	magnificently	 articulated	 in	 the	Code	Napoleon	 in	 1804:	 ‘Le	 juge	 qui	 refusera	
de	 juger,	sous	prétexte	du	silence,	de	l’obscurité	ou	de	l’insuffisance	de	la	loi,	pourra	être	poursuivi	comme	
coupable de déni de justice’. See also Lubbe v Cape	[2000]	1	WLR	1545	(HL)	at	1560.
120 Unlike	in	the	UK	in	Lubbe v Cape, the US Bhopal case was unsuccessful on grounds of forum non conveniens, 
as India was seen as the more appropriate forum for the claims against Union Carbide for the Bhopal Gas plant 
disaster:	see	Muchlinski,	PT	(1987)	‘The	Bhopal	Case:	Controlling	Ultrahazardous	Industrial	Activities	Undertaken	
by Foreign Investors’ 50 MLR	545.	At	the	time	of	writing,	after	25	years,	an	Indian	court	has	finally	passed	short	terms	
of	imprisonment	on	Indian	cadres	of	Union	Carbide	for	criminal	offences	that	led	to	the	tragedy,	a	final	act	that	can	
only	be	described	as	an	effective	denial	of	justice	for	the	thousands	of	innocent	victims	of	the	disaster.
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American-owned and not, as in the South African litigation, foreign. Nevertheless, foreign 
direct liability continues to be primarily a common law phenomenon, but, as Muchlinski’s 
article also shows, it has started, inevitably, to spread also to non-common law countries 
such as France, Belgium and Italy. Muchlinski argues that: ‘The development of foreign 
direct liability litigation … can be seen as a development involving a cultural position on 
the responsibility of corporate actors that is increasingly transnational and shared across 
national legal and social boundaries’. It remains true, however, that structural and cultural 
differences	between	national	legal	orders	remain	and	can	make	an	important	difference	
in the progress of this development, as the French case of Lipietz v SNCF,121 discussed 
by Muchlinski, shows. The decision of the Conseil d’Etat in that case, declaring the 
administrative courts incompetent to adjudicate a compensation claim against the French 
National Railway Corporation (SNCF)122 for the forced transportation of French Jewish 
citizens	to	Germany	at	the	time	of	the	German	occupation	of	France	during	the	Second	
World War, indicated that claimants could still in principle address their claims to the 
private law courts, something they never actually did as their chances of succeeding were 
considered very poor. This is mainly because in civil law countries the divide between 
civil and criminal proceedings is not as sharp as in common law jurisdictions, and claims 
for	human	rights	violations	need	to	be	tested,	first,	in	criminal	courts	that	will	also	deal	
with any tort claims by victims (participating as ‘partie civile’ in the criminal process, a 
procedure unknown in common law countries). Criminal courts are not able, however, to 
manage claims of compensation as well as civil courts, as the French practice has shown, 
especially when the evidence is buried in the distant past. The combination of a strict 
jurisdictional divide between administrative and private law competences123 and the 
practice of adjudicating victims’ compensation claims in criminal courts, is likely to cause 
direct foreign liability to remain an almost exclusively common law phenomenon for the 
foreseeable future. From a global perspective, Muchlinski’s article shows that ‘style’ of 
legal	orders	still	matters,	and	that	the	chances	of	private	law	acting	as	a	portal	or	wormhole	
leading to a brave new world of fusion between the private and the public are considerably 
slimmer in so-called civil law jurisdictions.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The role of private law remedies and procedures in the present conditions of globalisation 
cannot be exhaustively captured and analysed in a single collection. This is very much 
work	 in	progress,	 and	a	 significant	number	of	 important	 types	of	wrongs	 such	as	bio-
genetic or environmental harm still need to be addressed. Nevertheless, the studies 
assembled here show the extent to which the use of private law remedies and procedures 
121 Conseil	 d’État,	 21/12/2007,	No	 305966	 (Recueil	 Lebon);	 see	Grosswald	Curran,	V	 (2008),	 ‘Globalization,	
Legal Transplantation and Crimes against Humanity: The Lipietz Case’ 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 
363.
122 The	SNCF	was	held	to	have	been	obliged	to	comply	with	the	state	deportation	orders	at	the	time	and	could	
not be liable for administrative malpractice, only potentially for a separate private fault which, however, would 
fall under the jurisdiction of private justice (‘justice judiciaire’). See, for further analysis, Peter Muchlinski’s 
paper in this volume.
123 This	 division	 of	 jurisdiction	 required	 the	 defendant	 to	 be	 acting	 primarily	 as	 a	 public	 enterprise	 for	
administrative courts to have competence, and not merely as a ‘mixed economy’ enterprise as the SNCF did 
during the war years in France.
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in	 diverse	 contexts	 results	 in	 a	 ‘bottom-up’	 drive	 to	 legal	 globalisation,	 defying	 at	 the	
same	 time	 traditional	 classifications	and	divisions;	and	 the	extent	 to	which	private	 law	
remedies and procedures are the means of a transnational pursuit of restorative justice for 
individuals and communities, and catalysts of legal pluralism. Not contingent on national 
or	international	politics	and	linked	to	private	interest,	they	benefit	from	the	profit-driven	
financial	globalisation,	tools	in	the	hands	of	global	multi-million	law	firms	turning	claims	
into multi-lateral private investments. 
Financial globalisation has turned private law claims into a separate asset class, through 
third-party funding of private litigation.124 Transjurisdictional conversations between 
courts	are	increasing.	Restorative	justice	has	entered	the	financial	markets,	and	private	law	
litigation, often trans-border and often outside the investor’s jurisdiction, is enabled by the 
pursuit	of	profit.	And	the	increasing	use	and	popularity	of	ADR	mechanisms	and	practices	
in	many	 jurisdictions	 across	 the	world	amounts	 to	 a	 significant	 alternative	private	 law	
empowerment of victims of global wrongs, especially in developed Western countries but 
also, as Michael Palmer shows in his article, in important transitional democracies, most 
importantly China.
The global use of private law remedies and procedures is not without its enemies 
(sovereign states and others, such as MNEs), and does not come without undesirable 
collateral	effects,	as	 I	have	 tried	 to	show.	But	curtailing	global	private	 law	litigation	by	
erecting	new	national	jurisdictional	firewalls	looks,	at	the	time	of	writing,	as	unattractive	
as curtailing the global economy by means of national isolationist measures. Let global 
capitalism fund the pursuit of justice for at least some of its victims. He who wounds has 
also the power of healing.125
124 Typically,	 an	 investment	 fund	 pays	 all	 or	 part	 of	 the	 claimant’s	 legal	 fees,	 then	 takes	 a	 share	 of	 the	
damages	won,	say	10-40%.	The	London-managed	hedge	fund	MKM	Longboat	revealed	in	2007	plans	to	invest	
$100million	 (£50.5million)	 to	 finance	 European	 lawsuits:	 see	 http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/
columnists/article3080766.ece	(last	visited	9	July	2010).	As	reported	in	the	New	York	Times,	at	least	one	major	
global	financial	corporation,	Credit	Suisse,	has	a	unit	devoted	to	investing	in	one	side	of	a	lawsuit	in	exchange	
for	a	share	of	any	winnings.	Juris	Capital,	a	Chicago	firm	backed	by	two	hedge	funds,	also	does	this,	together	
with several other hedge funds: Glater, JD (2009) ‘Investing in Lawsuits, for a Share of the Awards’ New York 
Times	 3	 June.	Third-party	 funding	 is	 also	well-established	 in	Australia.	 In	 the	UK	 the	Civil	 Justice	Council,	
which advises the Lord Chancellor on civil legal issues, considers such funding arrangements an ‘acceptable 
option for mainstream litigation’.
125 As	in	Richard	Wagner’s	Tristan und Isolde.
